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ABSTRACT
We present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA), a new approach
to runtime assurance that provides safety guarantees for neural
controllers (obtained e.g. using reinforcement learning) of com-
plex autonomous and other cyber-physical systems without unduly
sacricing performance. NSA is inspired by the Simplex control
architecture of Sha et al., but with some signicant dierences. In
the traditional Simplex approach, the advanced controller (AC) is
treated as a black box; there are no techniques for correcting the
AC aer it generates a potentially unsafe control input that causes a
failover to the BC. Our NSA addresses this limitation. NSA not only
provides safety assurances for CPSs in the presence of a possibly
faulty neural controller, but can also improve the safety of such a
controller in an online seing via retraining, without degrading its
performance. NSA also oers reverse switching strategies, which
allow the AC to resume control of the system under reasonable
conditions, allowing the mission to continue unabated. Our ex-
perimental results on several signicant case studies, including a
target-seeking ground rover navigating an obstacle eld and a neu-
ral controller for an articial pancreas system, demonstrate NSA’s
benets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) in combination with reinforcement
learning (RL) are increasingly being used to train powerful AI agents.
ese agents have achieved unprecedented success in strategy
games, including beating the world champion in Go [24], surpass-
ing state-of-the-art chess and shogi engines [23], and achieving
human-level skill in Atari video games [14]. For these agents, safety
is neither a concern nor a requirement: when a game-playing agent
makes a mistake, the worst-case scenario is losing a game. e same
cannot be said for AI agents that control cyber-physical systems
(CPSs). A mistake by an AI controller may cause physical damage
to the CPS it controls and its environment, including humans.
In this paper, we present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA),
a new approach to runtime assurance that provides safety guaran-
tees for AI controllers, including neural controllers obtained using
reinforcement learning, of complex autonomous and other CPSs
without unduly sacricing performance. NSA is inspired by Sha et
al.’s Simplex control architecture [20, 22], but with some signicant
dierences. In this architecture, a decision module (DM) switches
control from a high-performance but unveried (hence potentially
unsafe) advanced controller (AC) to a veried-safe baseline controller
(BC) if a safety violation is imminent. In the traditional Simplex
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Figure 1: e Neural Simplex Architecture.
approach, the AC is treated as a black box, and there are no tech-
niques for correcting the AC aer it generates a potentially unsafe
control input that causes a failover to the BC.
NSA, illustrated in Fig. 1, addresses this limitation. e high-
performance Neural Controller (NC) is a DNN that given a plant
state (or raw sensor readings), produces a control input for the
plant. For complex plants and environments, manually designing a
high-performance controller can be challenging, even if a white-
box model of the plant is available. Learning a neural controller
using RL is an aractive alternative, as it only requires a black-box
model and an appropriately dened reward function.
NSA’s use of an NC, as opposed to the black-box AC found in
traditional Simplex, allows online retraining of the NC’s DNN to
occur. Such retraining is performed by NSA’s Adaptation Module
(AM) using RL techniques. For systems with large state spaces, it
may be dicult to achieve thorough coverage during initial training
of the NC. Online retraining has the advantage of focusing the
learning on areas of the state space that are relevant to the actual
system behavior; i.e., regions of the state space the system actually
visits.
e AM seeks to eliminate unsafe behavior exhibited by the NC,
without degrading its performance. While the BC is in control of
the plant, the NC runs in shadow mode and is actively retrained
by the AM. e DM can subsequently switch control back to the
NC with high condence that it will not repeat the same mistakes.
ese online retraining and reverse switching capabilities are some of
NSA’s distinguishing features. ey allow NSA to improve system
performance while continuing to ensure safety. Reverse switching
permits the mission to continue under the auspices of the high-
performance NC, which due to retraining becomes signicantly
more likely to deliver safe control inputs to the plant.
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We also address the problem of safe reinforcement learning (SRL)
[8, 32] during the initial training of the NC. We demonstrate that
recent approaches to SRL (e.g. justied speculative control [7] and
preemptive shielding [2]) are highly ineective when used with
policy-gradient RL algorithms. We use a simple yet eective ap-
proach to SRL that achieves superior results. In this approach,
when the learning agent produces an unsafe action, we: (i) use that
action as a training sample (but do not execute it), with a large
negative reward because it is unsafe, and (ii) use safe actions to
safely terminate the current trajectory (but not to train the agent).
In contrast, other recent approaches, such as those cited above, do
not use the unsafe action as a training sample.
We illustrate NSA on several example CPSs, including a target-
seeking rover navigating through an obstacle eld, and a neural
controller for an articial pancreas. Our results on these case studies
conclusively demonstrate NSA’s benets.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We introduce the Neural Simplex Architecture, a new ap-
proach to runtime assurance that provides safety guar-
antees for neural controllers of CPSs. We view NSA as
providing a platform for runtime-assured autonomy.
• We address a limitation of the traditional Simplex ap-
proach, namely lack of techniques for correcting the AC’s
behavior aer failover to the BC has occurred, so that re-
verse switching makes sense in the rst place.
• We provide a thorough evaluation of the NSA approach
on two signicant case studies.
Structure of the rest of the paper. Section 2 provides background
on the Simplex control architecture and reinforcement learning.
Section 3 presents our evaluation of SRL-PUA, an approach to
safe reinforcement learning with penalized unrecoverable actions.
Section 4 discusses our new NSA architecture. Sections 5-7 contain
our experimental results. Section 8 considers related work, while
Section 9 oers our concluding remarks and directions for future
work.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Simplex Architecture
e Simplex architecture was introduced by Sha et al. in [20, 22] as
a mechanism for ensuring high-condence in the control of safety-
critical systems. e architecture is similar to NSA (see Fig. 1), but
without the Adaptation Module (AM) and where the NC is called
the Advanced Controller (AC). e AC is in control of the plant
under nominal operating conditions, and is designed to achieve high
performance according to certain metrics (e.g., maneuverability, fuel
economy, mission duration). e BC is certied to keep the plant
within a prescribed safety region. A certied Decision Module (DM)
continually monitors the state of the plant and switches control to
the BC should the plant be in imminent danger (i.e., within the next
time step) of exiting the safety region. As such, Simplex assures
that the plant, e.g., an autonomous vehicle, is correctly controlled
even in the presence of a faulty AC.
e BC is certied to guarantee the safety of the plant only if
it takes over control while the plant’s state is within a recoverable
region RBC . As a simple example, consider the BC for a ground
rover that simply applies maximum deceleration amax to stop the
Figure 2: Agent-environment interaction in reinforcement
learning, from [25]. e dotted line represents the boundary
between the current and the next time step.
rover. e braking distance to stop the rover from a velocity v is
therefore dbr (v) = v2/(2 ·amax ). e BC can be certied to prevent
the rover from colliding with obstacles if it takes over control in
states such that dbr (v) is less than the minimum distance dmin to
any obstacle. e set of such states is the recoverable region of this
BC.
A control input is called recoverable if it keeps the plant inside
RBC within the next time step. Otherwise, the control input is
called unrecoverable. e DM switches control to the BC when the
AC produces an unrecoverable control input. e DM’s switching
condition determines whether a control input is unrecoverable. We
also refer to it as the forward switching condition (FSC) to distinguish
it from the condition for reverse switching, a new feature of NSA
we discuss in Section 4.
Techniques to determine the forward switching condition in-
clude: (i) shrink RBC by an amount equal to a time step times the
maximum gradient of the state with respect to the control input;
then classify any control input as unrecoverable if the current state
is outside this smaller region; (ii) simulate a model of the plant for
one time step if the model is deterministic and check whether the
plant strays from RBC ; (iii) compute a set of states reachable within
one time step and determine whether the reachable set contains
states outside RBC .
With the traditional Simplex approach, the AC is treated as a
black box. When the DM switches control to the BC, the BC remains
in control forever. ere are no guidelines for switching control
back to the AC, nor are there methods methods for correcting the
AC aer it produces an unsafe control input that causes the DM to
failover to the BC. Our NSA approach addresses these limitations.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning
is section provides an overview of Reinforcement Learning (RL)
algorithms for policies involving continuous, real-valued actions,
such as those applicable to the control of CPSs. Reinforcement
learning [25, 27] is concerned with the problem of how an agent
learns which sequence of actions to take in a given environment
such that a cumulative reward is maximized.
As shown in Fig. 2, at each time step t , the agent receives ob-
servation st and reward rt from the environment and takes action
at . e environment receives action at and emits observation st+1
and reward rt+1 in response. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be a discount factor.
e goal of reinforcement learning is to learn a policy pi (a | s), i.e., a
way of choosing an action ai at each time step such that expected
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discounted sum of rewards
∑∞
k=0 γ
krk+1 is maximized. e dis-
counted sum of future rewards is called the return and dened as
Rt =
∑∞
k=0 γ
krt+k+1.
e action-value function Qpi (s,a) = E[Rt | st = s,a] is the
expected return for selecting action a in state s and then always
following policy pi . e optimal action-value function Q∗(s,a) =
maxpi Qpi (s,a) gives the maximum action-value for state s and
action a achievable by any policy pi . e state-value function
V pi (s) = E[Rt | st = s] is the expected return starting from state
s , and then always following policy pi . e optimal state-value
function is V ∗(s) = arg maxa Q∗(s,a).
Early RL algorithms were designed for discrete state and action
spaces. ese algorithms usually use look-up tables to store policies
and value functions. As such, they are not applicable to large-scale
or continuous problems. Recent advances in RL are driven by deep
learning, as deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to
be very eective at approximating functions. In particular, deep
reinforcement learning algorithms use DNNs extensively for repre-
senting policies and value functions, extracting features from large
state spaces such as pixels in video games. Crucially, DNNs allow
deep reinforcement learning algorithms to operate eectively over
continuous state and action spaces.
Algorithms such as TRPO [18], DDPG [12], A3C [13], ACER [29],
PPO [19], and ACKTR [31] have emerged as promising solutions
for RL-based control problems in continuous domains. We use the
DDPG algorithm in our experiments.
3 SAFE REINFORCEMENT LEARNINGWITH
PENALIZED UNRECOVERABLE ACTIONS
is section presents our evaluation of safe reinforcement learning
with penalized unrecoverable actions (SRL-PUA), an approach for
safe reinforcement learning of CPS controllers. Although SRL-PUA
is our learning algorithm of choice for NSA, it is not specic to
NSA, and represents a general SRL technique.
A common approach to SRL is to lter the learning agent’s un-
recoverable actions before they reach the plant. For example, when
the learning agent produces an unrecoverable action, a runtime
monitor [7] or a preemptive shield [2] replaces it with a recoverable
one to continue the trajectory. e recoverable action is also passed
to the RL algorithm to update the agent. Unrecoverable actions are
discarded. We use the terms “recoverable” and “unrecoverable” in
the context of our broader discussion of NSA, but these terms can
be replaced by “safe” and “unsafe”, respectively, when talking about
other runtime-assurance methods.
While ltering-based approaches have been shown to work for
discrete-action problems that use Q-learning algorithms, we found
that they are not suitable when policy-gradient RL algorithms are
used. ere are two reasons for this. First, the replacement actions
are inconsistent with the learning agent’s probability distribution of
actions. is negatively aects algorithms such as REINFORCE [26,
30], Natural Policy Gradient [11], TRPO [18], and PPO [19], which
optimize stochastic policies, as they assume that the actions used
for training are sampled from the learning agent’s distribution. is
is less relevant to DDPG [12], which prefers uncorrelated samples
to train deterministic policies.
Secondly, without penalties for unrecoverable actions, the train-
ing samples always have positive rewards. is negatively impacts
a policy gradient algorithm’s ability to t a good model, e.g., a DNN
to estimate the state-value function or action-value function. A
policy-gradient algorithm uses this model to estimate the advan-
tage of an action; i.e., how good or bad the action is compared to
the average action, to update the learning agent. If there is a lack
of samples with penalties for unrecoverable actions, the model is
likely to be incorrect, leading to ineective updates to the learning
agent.
SRL-PUA represents a dierent approach to safe reinforcement
learning that works well with policy gradient methods. is is
important because policy gradient methods underlie much of the
recent success in RL. is approach still needs a way to determine
if an action is unrecoverable. We can use Simplex’s switching logic,
a runtime monitor [7], or a shield [2] for this purpose. When the
learning agent produces an unrecoverable action while exploring
a trajectory, SRL-PUA assigns a penalty (negative reward) to that
action, uses it as a training sample, and then uses recoverable
actions to safely terminate the trajectory.
e safety of the plant is guaranteed by the recoverable actions,
which may be obtained from a BC or another technique. ese
recoverable actions are not used to train the agent. e training
then continues by exploring a new trajectory from a random initial
state. is approach addresses both aforementioned issues, because
actions used for training are sampled from the learning agent, and
penalty samples are collected for a beer estimate of the state-value
function and/or the action-value function.
We used the DDPG and TRPO algorithms to train neural con-
trollers for an inverted pendulum (IP) control system to demonstrate
that learning without penalties for unrecoverable actions is highly
ineective. Details about the IP system, including the reward func-
tion and the BC used to generate recoverable actions, are presented
in Section 5.
We used the implementations of DDPG and TRPO in rllab (hps:
//github.com/rll/rllab) [6]. For TRPO, we trained two DNNs, one
for the mean and the other for the standard deviation of a Gaussian
policy. Both DDNs have two fully connected hidden layers of 32
neurons each and one output layer. e hidden layers all use the
tanh activation function, and the output layer is linear. For DDPG,
we trained a DNN that computes the action directly from the state.
e DNN has two fully connected hidden layers of 32 neurons each
and one output layer. e hidden layers use the ReLU activation
function, and the output layer uses tanh. We followed the choice
of activation functions in the examples accompanying rllab.
For each algorithm, we ran two training experiments. In the
rst one, we reproduce the ltering approach, i.e., we replace an
unrecoverable action produced by the learning agent with the BC’s
recoverable action, use the laer as the training sample, and con-
tinue the trajectory. We call this training method SRL-BC. In the
second experiment, we evaluate the SRL-PUA approach: whenever
the learning agent produces an unrecoverable action, we use that
action with an associated penalty as a training sample and termi-
nate the trajectory. Note that both algorithms explore dierent
trajectories by reseing the system to a random initial state when-
ever the current trajectory is terminated. We set the maximum
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TRPO DDPG
SRL-BC SRL-PUA SRL-BC SRL-PUA
Unrec Trajs 1,000 0 1,000 0
Comp Trajs 0 1,000 0 1,000
Avg. Return 112.53 4,603.97 61.52 4,596.04
Avg. Length 15.15 500 14.56 500
Table 1: Policy performance comparison. SRL-BC: pol-
icy trained with BC’s actions replacing unrecoverable ones.
SRL-PUA: policy trained with penalized unsafe actions. Un-
rec Trajs: # trajectories terminated during evaluation due
to an unrecoverable action. Comp Trajs: # trajectories that
reach limit of 500 time steps. Avg. Return and Avg. Length:
average return and trajectory length over 1,000 evaluated
trajectories.
TRPO DDPG
SRL-RND SRL-PUA SRL-RND SRL-PUA
Unrec Trajs 1,000 0 1,000 0
Comp Trajs 0 1,000 0 1,000
Avg. Return 183.36 4,603.97 5.93 4,596.04
Avg. Length 1.93 500 14 500
Table 2: Policy performance comparison. SRL-RND: policy
trained with random recoverable actions replacing unrecov-
erable ones.
trajectory length to 500 time steps; this means that a trajectory is
terminated when it exceeds 500 time steps.
We trained the DDPG and TRPO agents on a total of one million
time steps. Aer training, we evaluated all trained policies on
the same set of 1,000 random initial states. During evaluation,
if an agent produces an unrecoverable action, the trajectory is
terminated. e results are shown in Table 1. For both algorithms,
the policies trained with recoverable actions (SRL-BC approach)
produce unrecoverable actions in all test trajectories, while the
SRL-PUA approach, where the policies are trained with penalties
for unrecoverable actions, does not produce any such actions. As
a result, the laer policies achieve superior returns and trajectory
lengths (they are able to safely control the system the entire time).
In the above experiments, we replaced unrecoverable actions
with actions generated by a deterministic BC, whereas the monitor-
ing [7] and preemptive shielding [2] approaches replace unrecov-
erable actions with random recoverable actions. To show that our
conclusions are independent of this dierence, we ran one more ex-
periment with each learning algorithm, in which we replaced each
unrecoverable action with an action selected by randomly generat-
ing actions until a recoverable one is found. e results, shown in
Table 2, once again demonstrate that training with only recoverable
actions is ineective. Compared to ltering-based approaches (SRL-
BC in Table 1 and SRL-RND in Table 2), the SRL-PUA approach
yields a 25- to 775-fold improvement in the average return.
4 MAIN COMPONENTS OF NSA
In this section, we discuss the main components of NSA, namely the
neural controller (NC), the adaptation module (AM), and the reverse
switching logic. ese components in particular are not found in
the Simplex control architecture, the underlying inspiration for
NSA.
4.1 e Neural Controller
e NC is a DNN that can represent a deterministic or stochastic
policy. For a deterministic policy, the DNN maps system states (or
raw sensor readings) to control inputs. For a stochastic policy, the
DNN maps system states (or raw sensor readings) to parameters of a
probability distribution. For example, a DNN can represent a Gauss-
ian policy by mapping a system state to the mean and standard
deviation parameters of a Gaussian distribution; then, a control
input is drawn from that distribution. It is also possible to train a
separate DNN for each parameter of a probability distribution. e
NC can be obtained using any RL algorithm. We used the DDPG
algorithm with the safe learning strategy of penalizing unrecover-
able actions, as discussed in Section 3. DDPG is an aractive choice
because it works with deterministic policies, and allows uncorre-
lated samples to be added to the pool of samples for training or
retraining. e last property is important because it allows us to
collect disconnected samples of what the NC would do while the
plant is under the BC’s control, and use these samples for online
retraining of the NC.
4.2 e Adaptation Module
e AM retrains the NC in an online manner when the NC produces
an unrecoverable action that causes the DM to failover to the BC.
Since the traditional Simplex architecture already assures safety, the
main reason to retrain the NC is to improve performance. Recall that
the NC is trained to exhibit high performance, especially compared
to the BC. Without retraining, the NC may behave in the same, or
in a similar, manner that led to an earlier failover. With retraining,
the NC will be less likely to repeat the same or similar mistakes,
allowing it to remain in control of the system more oen.
Candidate techniques that we consider for online retraining of
the NC include supervised learning and reinforcement learning. In
supervised learning, state-action pairs of the form (s,a) are required
for training purposes. e training algorithm uses these examples to
teach the NC safe behavior. e control inputs produced by the BC
can be used as training examples. However, this will train the NC
to imitate BC’s behavior, which may lead to a loss in performance,
especially if the BC’s focus is primarily on safety.
erefore, we prefer reinforcement learning for online retraining,
with a reward function that penalizes unsafe control inputs, and
rewards safe, high-performance ones. is approach improves the
safety of the NC without unduly sacricing performance. In general,
the reward function for retraining can be designed as follows.
r (s,a, s ′) =
{
runrecov , if FSC(s,a)
rperf (s,a, s ′), otherwise
(1)
where FSC(s,a) is the forward switching condition (the condition
the DM evaluates to decide whether to transfer control from the NC
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to the BC), runrecov is a negative number used to penalize unrecov-
erable actions, and rperf (s,a, s ′) is a performance-related reward
function.
4.3 Retraining
Our basic procedure for online retraining is as follows. When the
NC outputs an unrecoverable action, the DM switches control to
the BC, and the AM computes the reward r for the NC’s unsafe
action and adds this sample to a pool of training samples. At every
time step while the BC is active, the AM takes a sample by running
the NC in shadow mode to compute its proposed action, and then
computing a reward for NC’s proposed action. Samples are of the
form (st ,at , st+1, rt ), where st is the current state, at is the action
proposed by the NC, st+1 is the state obtained by applying at to
state st , and rt = r (st ,at , st+1) is the reward for taking at in state
st . To obtain the next state st+1, the AM runs a simulation of the
system for one time step. e AM retrains the NC at each time step
the BC is in control, using the collected retraining samples and the
same algorithm as in the initial training.
We evaluated several variants of this procedure, by making dif-
ferent choices along the following dimensions.
(1) Start retraining with an empty pool of samples or with the
pool created during the initial training of the NC.
(2) Add exploration noise to NC’s action when collecting a
sample, or do not add noise. Adding noise means that the
action included in each training sample is the sum of the
action produced by NC and a random noise term νt . Note
that if NC is in control when the sample is collected, then
the action sent to the plant is NC’s action without noise;
using the noisy action for plant control would degrade
performance.
(3) Collect retraining samples only while BC is in control or at
every time step. In both cases, the action in each training
sample is the action output by NC (or a noisy version of
it); we never use BC’s action in a training sample. Also, in
both cases, the retraining algorithm for updating the NC
(using the accumulated sample pool) is run only while the
BC is in control.
We found that reusing the pool of training samples (DDPG’s
so-called experience replay buer) from initial training of the NC
helps evolve the policy in a more stable way, as retraining sam-
ples gradually replace initial training samples in the sample pool.
Another benet of reusing the initial training pool is that the NC
can be immediately retrained without having to wait for enough
samples to be collected online. We found that adding exploration
noise to NC’s actions in retraining samples and collecting retraining
samples at every time step increase the benet of retraining. is
is because these two strategies provide more diverse samples and
thereby help achieve more thorough exploration of the state-action
space.
4.4 Reverse Switching
e traditional Simplex architecture provides no guidelines for
reverse switching, i.e., switching from the BC to the AC. Conse-
quently, when the DM switches to the BC, the BC remains in control
Recoverable
region
NC-to-BC 
switching
boundary
BC-to-NC 
switching
boundary
Figure 3: Switching boundaries
forever. is sacrices performance. In contrast, NSA includes re-
verse switching to improve performance. An additional benet of
well-designed reverse switching is that it lessens the burden on
the BC to achieve performance objectives, leading to a simpler BC
design that focuses mainly on safety.
e reverse switching condition (RSC) is the condition that triggers
a switch back to the retrained NC. Control of the plant is returned to
the NC when the RSC is true and the FSC is false in the current state.
e laer condition ensures that reverse switching is safe. We seek
to develop reverse switching conditions that return control to NC
when it is safe to do so, and that avoid frequent switching between
the BC and NC. Retraining of the NC makes it more likely to deliver
recoverable control inputs going forward, thereby reducing the
frequency of switching. Nevertheless, an overly “eager” reverse
switching condition, which always immediately returns control to
NC when it is safe to do so, might cause an excessive amount of
switching.
We propose two approaches to reverse switching condition de-
sign. One approach is to reverse-switch if a forward switch will
not occur in the near future. For deterministic systems, this can be
checked by simulation; specically, simulate the composition of the
NC and plant for T time steps, and reverse-switch if the forward-
switching condition does not hold within this time horizon. For
nondeterministic systems, a similar technique can be employed,
except using a model checker instead of a simulator. is approach,
used in our inverted pendulum case study, directly prevents fre-
quent switching but may be computationally expensive for complex
systems. A simpler approach is to reverse-switch if the current plant
state is suciently far from the NC-to-BC switching boundary (see
Fig. 3). is approach is used in our rover navigation case study.
We emphasize that the choice of the reverse switching condition
does not aect safety and is application-dependent. In experiments
with the inverted pendulum and rover case studies, we also found
that varying T or the distance to the switching boundary has lile
impact on the number of time steps the system spent under the
BC’s control.
5 INVERTED PENDULUM CASE STUDY
is section describes the problem setup and experimental results
for the inverted pendulum case study. e inverted pendulum
is a well studied problem in both the Simplex and reinforcement
learning literature. e simplicity and small state-action space
make it an ideal starting point to showcase a proof of concept.
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5.1 e Inverted Pendulum Problem
We consider the classic control problem of keeping an inverted
pendulum upright on a movable cart. We describe the problem
briey here; a detailed exposition is available in [21]. e linearized
dynamics is given by
Ûx = A · x + B ·Va (2)
where x = [p,v,θ ,ω]T is the state vector consisting of the cart
positionp, cart velocityv , pendulum angle θ , and pendulum angular
velocity ω, and control input Va is the armature voltage applied to
the cart’s motor. e constant matrix A and constant vector B are
given in [10].
e safety constraints for this system are p ∈ [−1, 1] m, v ∈
[−1, 1] m/s, and θ ∈ [−15, 15]◦. e control input Va is constrained
to be in [−4.95, 4.95] V. Although ω is unconstrained, its physical
limits are implicitly imposed by the constraints on v . e control
objective is to keep the pendulum in the upright position, i.e., θ = 0.
5.2 Baseline Controller and Switching
Conditions
e BC is a linear state feedback controller of the form Va = K · x,
with the objective of stabilizing the system to the setpoint x = 0.
is controller can be obtained using the linear matrix inequality
(LMI) approach described in [21]. e LMI approach computes a
vector K and a matrix P such that:
• When the system state is inside the ellipsoid xT Px ≤ 1, all
safety constraints are satised.
• When the system starts in a state inside the ellipsoid xT Px ≤
1 and uses BC’s control law Va = K · x, it will remain in
this ellipsoid forever.
e gain vector K and matrix P produced by the LMI approach
for the described inverted pendulum system are
K =

0.4072
7.2373
18.6269
3.6725
 P =

1.0520 0.2580 1.2082 0.1988
0.2580 2.2108 4.6631 1.0090
1.2082 4.6631 33.9334 4.0269
0.1988 1.0090 4.0269 0.8424
 (3)
e matrix P denes a recoverable region RBC = {x | xT Px ≤ 1}.
e forward switching condition is that the control input Va will
drive the system outside R in the next time step. For the reverse
switching logic, the DM simulates the NC for 10 time steps starting
from the current state, and switches to the NC if there are no safety
violations within this time horizon.
5.3 e Neural Controller
e inverted pendulum problem can be considered “solved” by
many reinforcement learning algorithms, due to its small state-
action space. To demonstrate the online retraining capability of
NSA’s adaptation module, we intentionally under-train a neural
controller, so that it produces unrecoverable actions. We used the
DDPG algorithm with the following reward function, where v ′ and
θ ′ are the velocity and pendulum angle in state x′:
r (x,Va , x′) =
{
0, if FSC(x ,Va )
10 − 10 · v ′2 − (1 − cosθ ′), otherwise (4)
Initially Trained Retrained
Unrecov Trajs 976 0
Complete Trajs 24 1,000
Avg. Return 1,711.17 4,547.11
Avg. Length 203.26 500
Table 3: Benets of retraining for the inverted pendulum,
based on 1,000 trajectories used for evaluation. Unrecov
Trajs: # trajectories terminated because of an unrecoverable
action. Complete Trajs: # trajectories that reach limit of 500
time steps. Avg. Return andAvg. Length: average return and
average trajectory length over all 1,000 trajectories.
is reward function encourages the controller to (i) keep the
pendulum upright via the penalty term −(1 − cosθ ′), and (ii) mini-
mize the movement of the cart via the penalty term 10 · v ′2. e
total distance travelled by the cart is one performance metric where
the NC is expected to do beer than the BC. Whenever the forward
switching condition becomes true, the execution terminates. ere-
fore, the neural controller should also learn to respect (not trigger)
the FSC, in order to maximize the discounted cumulative reward.
Each execution is limited to 500 time steps.
5.4 Experimental Results
We under-trained an NC by training it for only 500,000 time steps.
e DNN for the NC has the same architecture as the DDPG DNN
described in Section 3. For our retraining experiments, we created
an NSA instance consisting of this NC and the BC described above.
With regard to the choices described in Section 4.3, we reused
the initial training pool that has 500,000 samples, added Gaussian
noise to NC’s actions in retraining samples, and collected retraining
samples at every time step.
We ran the NSA instance starting from 2,000 random initial
states. Out of the 2,000 trajectories, forward switching occurred
in 28 of them. During the 28 trajectories with forward switches,
the BC was in control for a total of 4,477 time steps. is means
there were 4,477 retraining updates to the NC. Notably, there was
only one forward switch in the last 1,000 trajectories; this shows
that the retraining during the rst 1,000 trajectories signicantly
improved the NC’s safety.
To evaluate the overall benets of retraining, we ran the initially
trained NC and the retrained NC starting from the same set of
1,000 random initial states. e results, given in Table 3, show that
aer just 4,477 retraining updates, the retrained NC completely
stops producing unrecoverable actions. As a result, retraining also
signicantly improves the average return, increasing it by a factor
of 2.7.
6 ROVER NAVIGATION CASE STUDY
is section describes the problem setup and experimental results
for the ground rover navigation case study.
6.1 e Rover Navigation Problem
We consider the problem of navigating a rover to a predetermined
target while avoiding collisions with static obstacles. e rover is
a circular disk of radius r . It has a maximum speed vmax and a
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Figure 4: Schematic illustration of our assumption about ob-
stacle shapes.
maximum acceleration amax . e maximum braking time is there-
fore tbr max = vmax /amax , and the maximum braking distance is
dbr max = v
2
max /(2 · amax ). e control inputs are the accelera-
tions ax and ay in the x and y directions, respectively. e system
uses discrete-time control with a time step of dt .
e rover is equipped with n distance sensors whose detection
range is lmax . e sensors are placed evenly around the perimeter
of the rover, i.e., the center lines of sight of two adjacent sensors
form an angle of 2pi/n. e rover can move only forwards, so its
orientation is the same as its heading angle. e state vector for the
rover is [x ,y,θ ,v, l1, l2, ..., ln ], where (x ,y) is the position, θ is the
heading angle, v is the velocity, and the li ’s are the sensor readings.
We assume the sensors have a small angular eld-of-view so
that each sensor reading reects the distance from the rover to an
obstacle along the sensor’s center line of sight. If a sensor does
not detect an obstacle, its reading is lmax . We assume that when
the sensor readings of two adjacent sensors si and sj are li and
lj , respectively, then the (conservative) minimum distance to any
obstacle point located in the cone formed by the center lines of
sight of si and sj is min{li , lj } − ϵ . Here, ϵ is a constant that limits
how much an obstacle can protrude into the blind spot between si
and sj ’s lines of sight; see Fig. 4.
6.2 Forward and Reverse Switching Conditions
A state s of the rover is recoverable if, starting from s , the baseline
controller (BC) can brake to a stop and the stopped rover will still
be at least distance dsafe from any obstacle. is implies that s is
recoverable if the minimum sensor reading lmin in state s is at
least dsafe + dbr (s) + ϵ , where the braking distance in state s is
dbr (s) = v2/(2 · amax ), where v is the rover’s speed in state s .
e forward switching condition is that the control input uNC
proposed by the NC will put the rover in an unrecoverable state in
the next time step. We check this condition by simulating the rover
for one time step with uNC as the control input, and then check if
lmin < dsafe + dbr (s) + ϵ .
e reverse switching condition is lmin ≥ m ·vmax ·dt +dsafe +
dbr max + ϵ . is ensures that the forward switching condition
does not hold for the next m − 1 time steps, i.e., the current state
is suciently far away from the forward switching boundary. e
constantm can be empirically chosen to reduce excessive back-and-
forth switching between NC and BC.
6.3 Baseline Controller
e BC performs the following steps:
(1) Apply the maximum braking power amax until the rover
stops.
(2) Randomly pick a safe heading angle θ based on the current
position and sensor readings.
(3) Rotate the rover until it’s heading angle is θ .
(4) Move with heading angle θ until either the forward switch-
ing condition becomes true (this is checked aer each time
step by the BC itself), in which case the BC is re-started
at Step 1, or the reverse switching condition becomes true
(this is checked by the DM), in which case NC takes over.
6.4 Experimental Results
e parameters used in our experiments are r = 0.1 m, vmax = 0.8
m/s, amax = 1.6 m/s2, lmax = 2 m, n = 32, dsafe = 0.2 m, ϵ = 0.01
m, m = 5, and dt = 0.1 s. e target is xed at location (0, 0).
e eld of circular obstacles is also xed during training and
testing, as shown in Fig. 5. e initial position (x0,y0) of the rover
is randomized in the area [−5, 5]×[−5, 5] during training and testing.
e NC is a DNN with two ReLU hidden layers, each of size 64, and
a tanh output layer. We used the DDPG algorithm for both initial
training and online retraining of the NC. For initial training, we
ran DDPG for 5 million time steps.
e reward function for initial training and online retraining is
r (s,a, s ′) =

−20, 000, if FSC(s,a)
10, 000, if DT(s) ≤ 0.2
−1 − 20 · DT(s), otherwise
(5)
where FSC(s,a) is the forward switching condition, and DT(s) is
the center-to-center distance from the rover to the target in state s .
e rover is considered to have reached the target if DT(s) ≤ 0.2
because the target is a disk with radius of 0.1 m. If the action a
triggers the forward switching logic, it is penalized by assigning a
negative reward of -20,000. If a causes the rover to reach the target,
it receives a reward of 10,000. All other actions are penalized by an
amount proportional to the distance to the target; this encourages
the agent to reach the target in the fewest number of time steps.
A video showing how the initially trained NC navigates the
rover through the same obstacle eld used in training is available
at hps://youtu.be/nTeQ4eHF-fQ. e video shows that the NC is
able to reach the target most of the times. However, it occasionally
drives the rover into unrecoverable states. If we pair this NC with
the BC in an NSA instance, the rover never enters unrecoverable
states. A video showing this NSA instance in action with reverse
switching enabled and online retraining disabled is available at
hps://youtu.be/XbJKrnuxcuM. Note that in this video, we curated
only interesting trajectories where switches occurred. In the video,
the rover is black when the NC is in control; it turns green when
the BC is in control.
e initially trained NC also performs reasonably well on random
obstacle elds not seen during training. A video of this is available
at hps://youtu.be/ICT8D1uniIw. e rover under NC control is
able to reach the target most of the time. However, it sometimes
overshoots the target, suggesting that we may need to vary the
target position during training. We plan to investigate this as future
work.
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Figure 5: Training and testing setup for the rover case study.
e red disks are obstacles, the black dot with an inscribed
white triangle is the rover, and the blue dot is the target. e
spokes coming out of the rover represent the distance sen-
sors. e rover’s heading angle is shown by the orientation
of the inscribed triangle. e length of the green line, which
is a prex of the spoke for the sensor pointing directly for-
ward, is proportional to the rover’s speed.
Our experiments with online retraining start with the same
NSA instance as above, except with online retraining enabled. All
seings for DDPG are the same as in initial training, except that we
initialize the AM’s pool of retraining samples with the pool created
by initial training, instead of an empty pool. e pool created by
initial training contains one million samples; this is the maximum
pool size, which is a parameter of the algorithm. When creating
retraining samples, the AM adds Gaussian noise to the NC’s actions.
e NC’s actions are collected at every time step, regardless of
which controller is in control; thus, the AC also collects samples of
what the NC would do while the BC is in control.
We ran the NSA instance starting from 10,000 random initial
states. Out of 10,000 trajectories, forward switching occurred in
456 of them. Of these 456 trajectories, the BC was in control for
a total of 70,974 time steps. is means there were 70,974 (∼71K)
retraining updates to the NC. To evaluate the benets of online
retraining, we compared the performance of the NC aer initial
training and aer 20K, 50K, and 71K updates. We evaluated each
of these controllers (by itself, without NSA) by running it from
the same set of 1,000 random initial states and collecting multiple
performance metrics.
e results are given in Table 4. Aer 71K retraining updates,
the NC outperforms the initially trained version in every metric.
Table 4 also shows that the performance of the NC increases with
the number of retraining updates. is demonstrates that NSA
improves not only the safety of the NC, but also its performance.
We resumed initial training to see if this would produce similar
improvements. We continued the initial training for an additional
71K, 1M, and 3M updates. e results appear in Table 5. Extend-
ing the initial training slowly improves both the safety and the
performance of the NC but requires substantially more updates.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5 shows that 71K of retraining updates in
IT 20K RT 50K RT 71K RT
FSCs 100 79 43 8
Timeouts 35 49 50 22
Targets 865 872 907 970
Avg. Return -9,137.3 -9,968.82 -5,314.57 -684.01
Avg. Length 138.67 142.29 156.13 146.56
Table 4: Benets of retraining for ground rover navigation.
ere were a total of 71K updates to the NC. IT: results for
initially trained NC. 20K RT, 50K RT, and 71K RT: results
for NC aer 20K, 50K and 71K retraining updates during one
retraining experiment. All of the controllers are evaluated
on the same set of 1,000 random initial states. FSCs: # tra-
jectories in which FSC becomes true. Timeouts: # trajecto-
ries that reach the limit of 500 time steps without reaching
the target or having FSC become true. Targets: # trajectories
that reach the target. Avg. Return and Avg. Length: average
return and average trajectory length over all 1,000 trajecto-
ries.
IT 71K EIT 1M EIT 3M EIT
FSCs 100 108 108 78
Timeouts 35 224 78 43
Targets 865 668 814 879
Avg. Return -9,137.3 -12,448.3 -9,484.83 -3,320.4
Avg. Length 138.67 215.7 137.75 124.26
Table 5: Extended initial training performance. 71K EIT,
1M EIT, and 3M EIT: results for NC aer 71K, 1M, and 3M
updates during extended initial training. All of the con-
trollers are evaluated using the same set of 1,000 random
initial states used for the evaluation results in Table 4
.
NSA provide signicantly more benets than even 3M additional
updates of initial training. NSA’s retraining is much more eective,
because it samples more unrecoverable actions while the plant is
under BC’s control, and because it tends to focus retraining on
regions of the state-action space of greatest interest, especially re-
gions near the forward switching boundary and regions near the
current state. In contrast, trajectories in initial training start from
random initial states.
We also experimented with other combinations of choices along
the three dimensions listed in Section 4.3. We expected the combi-
nation described above to provide the best results, for the reasons
presented in Section 4.3. Indeed, we found that none of the other
combinations produced consistent safety and performance improve-
ments over time as did the combination described above.
7 ARTIFICIAL PANCREAS CASE STUDY
is section describes the problem setup and experimental results
for the articial pancreas case study.
7.1 e Articial Pancreas Problem
e articial pancreas (AP) is a system for controlling blood glucose
(BG) levels in Type 1 Diabetes patients through the automated
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delivery of insulin. Here we consider the problem of controlling
the basal insulin, i.e., the insulin required in between meals. We
consider a deterministic linear model (adapted from [4]) to describe
the physiological state of the patient. e dynamics are given by:
ÛG(t) = − p1 ·G(t) − p2 · I (t) + p3 (6)
ÛI (t) = − ke · I (t) + ka
VI
x(t) (7)
Ûx(t) = − ka · x(t) + u(t) (8)
where G(t) is the dierence between the reference BG, rBG = 7.8
mmol/L, and the patient’s BG;u(t) (mU/min) is the insulin input (i.e.,
the control input); x(t) (mU) is the insulin mass in the subcutaneous
compartment; and I (t) is the plasma insulin concentration (mU/L).
Parameters p1, . . . ,p3,ke ,ka ,VI > 0 are patient-specic.
e AP should keep BG levels within safe ranges, typically 4
to 11 mmol/L, and in particular it should avoid hypoglycemia (i.e.,
BG levels below the safe range), a condition that leads to severe
health consequences. Hypoglycemia happens when the controller
overshoots the insulin dose. What makes insulin control uniquely
challenging is the fact that the controller cannot take a corrective
action to counteract an excessive dose; its most drastic safety mea-
sure is to shut o the insulin pump. For this reason, the baseline
controller for the AP sets u = 0.
For this case study, we assume that the controller can observe the
full state of the system, and thus, the corresponding policy is a map
of the form (G, I ,x) 7→ u. We perform discrete-time simulations of
the ODE system with a time step of 1.
7.2 Neural Controller
Similarly to the inverted pendulum problem, we intentionally under-
train the NC so that it produces unrecoverable actions. is results
in an AP controller with poor performance. Controllers with poor
performance may arise in practice for a variety of reasons, including
the (common) situation where the physiological parameters used
during training poorly reect the patient’s physiology. e DNN
for the NC has the same architecture as the DDPG DNN described
in Section 3.
e reward function is designed to penalize deviations from the
reference BG level. Such a deviation is promptly given by the state
variableG . We give a positive reward whenG is close to zero (within
±1), and we penalize larger deviations with a 5× factor for mild
hyperglycemia (1 < G ≤ 3.2), a 7× factor for mild hypoglycemia
(−3.8 ≤ G < −1), 9× for strong hyperglycemia (G > 3.2), and
20× for strong hypoglycemia (G < −3.8). e other constants are
chosen to avoid jump discontinuities in the reward function.
r (s,u, s ′) =

10 − |G ′ |, if |G ′ | ≤ 1
14 − 5 · |G ′ |, if 1 < G ′ ≤ 3.2
26.8 − 9 · |G ′ |, if G ′ > 3.2
16 − 7 · |G ′ |, if − 3.8 ≤ G ′ < −1
65.4 − 20 · |G ′ | otherwise
(9)
where G ′ is the value of G in state s ′. is reward function is
inspired by the asymmetric objective functions used in previous
work on model predictive control for the AP [9, 16].
Initially Trained Retrained
Unrecov Trajs 1,000 0
Complete Trajs 0 1,000
Avg. Return 824 2,402
Avg. Length 217 500
Table 6: Benets of retraining for the AP case study. ere
were 61 updates to the NC. Row and column labels are as per
Table 3.
7.3 Forward and Reverse Switching Conditions
A state s is recoverable if under the control of the BC (u = 0), the
system does not undergo hypoglycemia (G ′ < −3.8) in any future
state starting from s . is condition is checked by simulating the
system from s with u = 0 until G starts to increase: as one can
see from the system dynamics (6–8), this is the point at which G
reaches its minimum value under the BC.
e FSC holds when the control input proposed by the NC leads
to an unrecoverable state in the next time step. For reverse switch-
ing, we use the default strategy of returning control to the NC
if applying the NC for a bounded time horizon T = 10 from the
current state does not produce a state satisfying the FSC.
7.4 Experimental Results
To produce an under-trained NC, we used 107,000 time steps of
initial training. For retraining, we used the same seings as in the
inverted pendulum case study.
We ran the NSA instance for 10,000 trajectories. Among the rst
400 trajectories, 250 led to forward switches and hence retraining.
e retraining that occurred in those 250 trajectories was very ef-
fective, because forward switching never occurred aer the rst 400
trajectories. As we did for the other case studies, we then evaluated
the benets of retraining by comparing the performance of the
initially trained NC and the retrained NC (by themselves, without
NSA) on trajectories starting from the same set of 1,000 random
initial states. e results are in Table 6. We observe that retraining
greatly improves the safety of the NC: the initially trained con-
troller reaches an unrecoverable state in all 1,000 of these trajecto-
ries, while the retrained controller never reaches an unrecoverable
state. e retrained controller’s performance is also signicantly
enhanced, with an average return 2.9 times higher than that of the
initial controller.
8 RELATEDWORK
e traditional Simplex architecture does not consider automatic
reverse switching. In [20, 21], when the AC produces an unrecover-
able action, it is disabled until it is manually re-enabled. In [10], the
authors briey mention that reverse switching should be performed
only when the FSC is false, and that a stricter RSC might be needed
to prevent frequent switching; but the paper does not pursue this
idea further. In contrast to our work, it does not suggest a general
approach to designing a stricter RSC or suggest a specic RSC for
any case study.
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In terms of our approach to safe reinforcement learning, we refer
the reader to two recent comprehensive literature reviews on the
subject [8, 32].
In [3], a shield (a.k.a. post-posed shield in [2]) is synthesized
from a temporal-logic safety specication. e shield monitors the
actions from the agent and corrects an action if it causes a safety
violation. is shielding approach is limited to nite-state systems
and nite action spaces. It can be applied to an innite-state system
if a good nite-state abstraction of the system is available. NSA
uses an approach based on policy-gradient reinforcement learning
for realistic applications with innite state spaces and continuous
action spaces.
In [7], veried runtime monitors generated by ModelPlex are
used in the training phase of reinforcement learning to constrain
the actions the agent can choose to a set of safe actions at every
training step. However, the learned policy is not guaranteed to
be safe. e paper mentions the idea of using the learned policy
together with a known-safe fallback policy, but does not elaborate
on this approach. In contrast, we discuss in detail how to guarantee
safety and retrain the controller during deployment. Also, while it
is easy to check if an action is safe, it is unclear from their paper
how to eciently obtain a set of safe actions at every training step.
In [17], probabilistic model checking is used to verify policies,
i.e., to bound the risk that a trained agent damages either the envi-
ronment or itself. e authors also present dierent approaches for
repairing learned policies such that the probability of the system
reaching as unsafe state under control of the repaired policy is
bounded. Instead of providing a probability bound, NSA guaran-
tees safety of the system during both training and deployment of
the controller. Additionally, their repairs are not performed online,
whereas NSA retrains the controller online.
In [5], the authors present a method for constructing and using
Lyapunov functions under the framework of constrained Markov
decision problems (CMDPs) to guarantee the safety of a policy dur-
ing training. e paper demonstrates the eectiveness of the Lya-
punov approach when used with policy-iteration and Q-learning
methods for discrete state and action problems. eir approach is
currently not applicable to policy gradient algorithms, such as the
DDPG algorithm used in our experiments, and continuous state
and action problems.
In [28], the authors propose the Reward Constrained Policy
Optimization (RCPO) approach, in which a per-state penalty with
an associated weight is added to the reward function. e weight
is dynamically changed during training. RCPO is shown to almost
surely converge to a constraint-satisfying solution. However, RCPO
does not address the problem of guaranteeing safety during training.
Our approach diers in that we penalize an unrecoverable action
and terminate the current trajectory to ensure the safety of the
plant. Additionally, the paper does not consider online retraining,
a distinguishing feature of NSA.
In [1], the authors propose the Constrained Policy Optimization
(CPO) algorithm for constrained MDPs that guarantees safe explo-
ration during training. Although the theory behind CPO is sound,
the practical algorithm presented in the paper is an approximation.
As a result, the algorithm only ensures approximate satisfaction
of constraints and guarantees an upper bound on a cost associ-
ated with constraint violations. is work also neglects online
retraining.
In [15], control barrier functions are used to provide safety for
an RL algorithm. In this approach, unknown system dynamics is
learned using Gaussian processes. As a result, the safety guarantee
is probabilistic. During training and deployment, the agent is lim-
ited to explore within a safe region of the state space dened by a
barrier function. Whenever the agent produces an unsafe action,
the action is minimally perturbed so that the resulting action will
not drive the system out of the safe region. In contrast, in NSA,
when the NC makes an unsafe action, the BC takes over and the
NC is retrained by the AM.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the Neural Simplex Architecture for assuring the
runtime safety of cyber-physical systems with neural controllers.
NSA features an adaptation module that retrains the NC in an
online fashion, seeking to eliminate any faulty behavior exhibited
by the NC. NSA’s reverse switching capability allows control of the
plant to be returned to the NC aer a failover to BC has occurred,
thereby allowing NC’s performance benets to come back into play.
We have demonstrated the utility of NSA on three case studies, the
inverted pendulum, a target-seeking ground rover navigating an
obstacle eld, and an articial pancreas system. As future work, we
plan to investigate methods for establishing statistical bounds on
the degree of improvement that online retraining yields in terms of
safety and performance of the NC.
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